This working paper presents an agent-based computational model of civil violence. We present two variants of the Civil Violence Model. In the first, a central authority seeks to suppress decentralized rebellion. In the second, a central authority seeks to suppress communal violence between two warring ethnic groups.
The Agent Specification
First, in any model of rebellion, there must be some representation of political grievance. Our treatment of grievance will be extremely simple, and will involve only two highly idealized components which, for lack of better terminology, we will call Hardship and Legitimacy. Their definitions are as follows:
H: The agent's perceived hardship. In the current model, this is exogenous. We assume it to be heterogeneous across agents. Lacking further data, each individual's value is simply drawn from U(0,1), the uniform distribution on the interval (0,1). Of course, perceived hardship alone does not a revolution make. As noted in the Russian revolutionary journal, Narodnaya Volya, "No village ever revolted merely because it was hungry."
(Quoted in Kuran, 1989 and deNardo, 1985) . Another crucial factor is:
The perceived legitimacy of the regime, or central authority. In the current model, this is exogenous, is equal across agents, and in the runs discussed below, will be varied over its arbitrarily defined range of 0 to 1.
The level of grievance any agent feels toward the regime is assumed to be based on these variables. Of the many functional relationships one might posit, we will assume:
G = H(1-L).

Grievance is the product of perceived hardship (H) and perceived "illegitimacy," if you will (1-L). The intuition behind this functional form is
simple. If legitimacy is high, then hardship does not induce political grievance. For example, the British government enjoyed unchallenged legitimacy (L=1) during World War II. Hence, the extreme hardship produced by the blitz of London did not produce grievance toward the government. By the same token, if people are suffering (high H), then the revelation of government corruption (low L) may be expected to produce increased levels of grievance.
Of course, the decision to rebel depends on more than one's grievance.
For example, some agents are simply more inclined to take risks than others. Accordingly, we define R: The agent's level of risk aversion. Heterogeneous across agents, this (like H) is assumed to be uniformly distributed across agents. Each individual's level is drawn from U(0,1) and is fixed for the agent's lifetime.
All but the literally risk neutral will estimate the likelihood of arrest before actively joining a rebellion. This estimate is assumed to increase with the ratio of cops to already rebellious--so-called "active"--agents within the prospective rebel's vision. To model this, we define:
v: The agent's vision. This is the number of lattice positions (north, south, east, and west of the agent's current position) that the agent is able to inspect. It is exogenous and equal across agents. As in most agent-based models, vision is limited; information is local. Letting (C/A)v denote the copto-active ratio within vision v, we assume the agent's estimated arrest probability P to be given by
P = 1-exp[-k(C/A)v].
The constant k is set to ensure a plausible estimate (of P=.9) when C=1 and A=1. Notice that A is always at least 1, since the agent always counts himself as active when computing P. He is asking, "How likely am I to be arrested if I go active?" This functional form makes P a legitimate probability density. Again, the intuition is very simple. Imagine being a deeply aggrieved agent considering throwing a rock through a bank window.
If there are 10 cops at the bank window, you are much more likely to be arrested if you are the first to throw a rock (C/A=10) than if you show up when there are already 29 rock-throwing agents (C/A=1/3). For a fixed level of cops, the agent's estimated arrest probability falls the more actives there are. This simple idea will play an important role in the analysis.
Clearly, in considering whether or not to rebel, a risk neutral agent won't care what the estimated arrest probability is, while a risk averse agent will. It will therefore prove useful to define N = RP: The agent's net risk--the product of his risk aversion and estimated arrest probability. (This can be considered the special, α =0, case of N RPJ = α where J is the jail term, discussed below). These ingredients in hand, the agent's behavioral rule is summarized in the Table below.
Table. Agent State Transition
If, for an agent in state Q, the difference G-N exceeds some non-negative threshold T--which could be zero--then that quiescent agent goes active.
Otherwise, he stays quiescent. If, for an agent in state A, the difference exceeds T, then that active agent stays active. Otherwise, he goes quiescent.
In summary, the agent's simple local rule is:
Agent Rule A: If G-N>T be Active; Otherwise, be Quiet.
This completes the agent specification.
Bounded Rationality
It is natural to interpret this rule as stipulating that the agent take whichever binary action (Active or Quiescent) maximizes expected utility where, in the spirit of Kuran (1989) , G-N is the expected utility of publicly expressing one's private grievance, and T is the expected utility of not expressing it (i.e., of preference falsification, in Kuran's terminology).
Typically, we set T at some small positive value. Notice, however, that if it takes negative values, like -G (i.e., the frustration level associated with preference falsification equals the grievance level itself), agents may find it rational to rebel knowing that they will suffer negative utility. It's simply worse to "sit and take it anymore." Agents weigh expected costs and benefits, but they are not hyper-rational. One might say (pace Olsen, 1965 ) that individual rationality is "local" also, in the sense that the agent's expected utility calculation excludes any estimate of how his isolated act of rebellion may effect the social order. Notice, very importantly, that deterrence is local in this model and depends on the local (individually visible)--not the global--ratio of cops to actives, which is highly dynamic in this spatial model with movement.
The Cop Specification
The cops are much simpler than prospective rebels. Their attributes are as follows:
v*: The cop vision. This is the number of lattice positions (north, south, east, and west of the cop's current position) that the cop is able to inspect. It is exogenous and equal across cops. The cops' v* need not equal the agent's v, but will typically be small relative to the lattice size: cop vision is local also. The cops, like the other agents, have one simple rule of behavior:
Cop Rule C: Inspect all sites within v* and arrest a random Active Agent.
Cops never defect to the revolution in this model.
Movement and Jail Terms
Though the range of motion will vary depending on the numerical values selected for v and v*, the syntax of the movement rule is the same for both agents and cops:
Movement Rule M: Move to a random site within your vision.
Regarding jail terms for arrested actives, these are exogenous and set by the user. Specifically, the user selects a value for the maximum jail term, J_max. Then, any arrested active is assigned a jail term drawn randomly from U(0, J_max). J_max will affect the dynamics in important ways by removing actives from circulation for various durations. However, for the present version of the model with alpha implicitly set to zero (see discussion above), there is no deterrent effect of increasing the jail term. Setting alpha to a positive value would produce a deterrent effect. In addition to having no deterrent effect, we also assume agents leave jail exactly as aggrieved as when they entered.
Measurement
It is important to state forthrightly that we make no pretense to measuring model variables such as perceived hardship or legitimacy. The immediate question is whether this highly idealized model is sufficient to generate recognizable macroscopic revolutionary dynamics of fundamental interest. If not, then issues of measurement are moot. So, the first issue is whether the model produces interesting output. In addition to data generated by the model, run-time visualization of output is very useful. Our graphical strategy is as follows.
Graphics
Events transpire on a lattice. Agents and cops move around this space and interact. We are interested in the dynamics of grievance and--quite separately--in the dynamics of revolutionary action. The point of separating these private and public spheres is to permit illustration of a core point in all research on this topic: public order may prevail despite tremendous private opposition to--feelings of grievance toward--a regime. Given this important distinction between private grievance and public action, we will show two screens (see Figure 1) . The model simply iterates this procedure until the user quits or some stipulated state is attained. What can one generate in this extremely simple model? We present 5 Runs.
Run 1. Individual Deceptive Behavior
Despite their manifest simplicity, the agents do something we had not anticipated. This behavior is displayed below in two snapshots from Animation 1.
Animation 1. Deceptive Individuals
Focus then on the circled agent in the left frame. Though not shown, this agent's grievance level is high. However, there are two cops within his vision and he is Blue (Quiescent). But, he turns Red (Actively rebellious) the moment these cops move away, as shown in the right frame. In short, the agents exhibit unexpected deceptive behavior: privately aggrieved agents turn Blue (as if they were non-rebellious) when cops are near, but then turn Red (actively rebellious) when cops move away. They are reminiscent of Mao's directive that revolutionaries should "swim like fish in the sea," making themselves indistinguishable from the surrounding population. Ex post facto, the behavior is easily understood: the cop's departure reduces the C/A ratio within the agent's vision, reducing his estimated arrest probability, and with it his net risk, N, all of which pushes G-N over the agent's activation threshold, and he turns Red. But it was not anticipated.
Moreover, it would probably not have been detected without a spatial visualization; individual deception would not be evident in a time series of total rebels, for example. With both cops and agents in random motion, more interesting dynamics emerge.
Run 2. Free Assembly Catalyzes Rebellious Outbursts
With both agents and cops in random motion, it may happen that high concentrations of actives arise endogenously in zones of low cop density. This can depress local C/A ratios to such low levels that even the mildly aggrieved find it rational to join. This catalytic mechanism is illustrated in Animation 2.
Random spatial correlations of activists catalyze local outbursts. This is why freedom of assembly is the first casualty of repressive regimes. Relatedly, it is also the rationale for curfews. The mechanism is that local activist concentrations reduce local C/A (cop-to-active) ratios, reducing (via the equation for P above) the risk of joining the rebellion. To be the first rioter, one must be either very angry or very risk neutral, or both. But to be the 4000th--if the mob is already big, relative to the cops--the level of grievance and risk taking required to join the riot is far lower. This is how, as Mao Tse Tung liked to say, "A single spark can cause a prairie fire." (Quoted in Kuran, 1989) . Coincidentally, the Bolshevik newspaper founded by Lenin was called Iskra--the spark! The Russian revolution itself provides a beautiful example of the chance spatial correlation of aggrieved agents. As Kuran (1989; 63) A random coalescence of aggrieved agents depresses the local C/A ratio, quickly emboldening all present to openly express their discontent.
A time series of total rebels is also revealing. It displays one of the hallmarks (Young 1998) of complex systems: punctuated equilibrium. Long periods of relative stability are punctuated by outbursts of rebellious activity.
Figure 2. Punctuated Equilibrium
And indeed, many major revolutions (e.g., East German) are episodic in fact.
The same qualitative pattern of behavior-punctuated equilibrium-persists indefinitely, as shown in Figure 3 , which plots the data over some 20 thousand iterations of the model.
Figure 3. Punctuated Equilibrium Persists
Waiting Time Distribution
Is there any underlying regularity to these complex dynamics? For many complex systems, it turns out to be of considerable interest to study the distribution of waiting times between outbursts above some threshold. In this analysis, we set the threshold at 50 actives. An outburst begins when the number of actives exceeds 50 and ends when it falls below 50. We are interested in the time between the end of one outburst and the start of the next. Sometimes, we have to wait a long time (e.g., 100 periods) until the next outburst. Sometimes, the next outburst is nearly immediate (e.g., a gap of only 2 periods). The frequency distribution of these inter-outburst waiting times, for 100,000 iterations of the model, is shown in Figure 4 . 1  470  939  1408  1877  2346  2815  3284  3753  4222  4691  5160  5629  6098  6567  7036  7505  7974  8443  8912  9381  9850  10319  10788  11257  11726  12195  12664  13133  13602  14071  14540  15009  15478  15947  16416  16885  17354  17823 Time (iterations) # actives
Figure 4. Waiting Time Distribution
In the complexity literature, one often encounters the notion of an "emergent phenomenon." I have argued elsewhere (Epstein, 1999) that substantial confusion surrounds this term. However, if one defines emergent phenomena simply as "macroscopic regularities arising from the purely local interaction of the agents," (Epstein and Axtell, 1996) , then this waiting time distribution surely qualifies. It was entirely unexpected, and would have been quite hard to predict from the underlying rules of agent behavior. For instance, Figure 4 suggests a Weibull or Lognormal distribution. While rigorous identification is a suitable topic for future research, these data are clearly not uniformly 10  30  50  70  90  110  130  150  170  190  210  230  250  270  290  310  330  350  370  390  410  430  450  470  490  510  530  550  570 waiting time distribution, one is just as likely to wait 100 cycles as 50; that is not the case in our model, at least for these parameters. The mean of these data-the average duration between outbursts--is 60. 1 Clearly, most of the probability density is concentrated around this value: this means that we are much more likely to get successive outbursts within 60 cycles than within 100.
If one is willing to truncate this distribution-throwing out the most high frequency events (waiting times less than 30 cycles), the remaining distribution is well fit by the negative exponential. In particular, the logged truncated data are shown on Figure 5 . Ordinary Least Squares regression yields an R-squared of 0.98 with slope -0.07 and intercept 3.5. The negative exponential distribution is ubiquitous in the analysis of failure rates-the rates at which electrical and mechanical systems break down. It would be interesting if "social breakdowns" followed a similar distribution. Another obvious issue is the sensitivity of this distribution to variations in key parameters. For example, how would an increase in the jail term deform the distribution? One might conjecture that, by removing rebellious agents from circulation for a longer period, increasing the jail term would "flatten" the distribution and raise its mean. All of these issues could be fruitfully explored in the future. For the moment, the core point is that a powerful statistical regularity underlies the model's punctuated equilibrium dynamics.
Outburst Size Distribution
A second natural statistical topic is the size distribution of rebellious outbursts. To study this, we use the same parameterization as above and adopt the same threshold: 50 actives. But there are numerous ways to measure outburst size for statistical purposes. For example, imagine a flareup lasting five days with the following number of actives per day: 60, 100, 120, 95, and 80. This outburst has a peak active level of 120. It has average (daily) activation of 100, and total activation (the sum) of 500. The size distribution of outbursts using the total activation measure is shown in Figure 6 .
Figure 6. Total Activation Distribution
The mean and standard deviation are, respectively, 708 and 230. The distributions using the peak and average data are qualitatively similar. As in the case of the waiting time distribution, one could conduct further analysis to identify the best fit to Figure 6 . But the point to emphasize here is not which distribution is best, but that some macroscopic regularity emerges. A major strength of agent models is that they generate a wealth of data amenable to statistical treatment.
A Ripeness Index
Turning to another topic, we often speak of a society as being "ripe for revolution." In using this terminology, we have in mind a high level of tension or private frustration. Does the present model allow us to quantify We turn now to a comparison of two runs involving reductions in legitimacy. Both runs begin with legitimacy at a high level. In the first, we execute a large absolute reduction (from L=.9 to L=.2) in legitimacy, but in small increments (of a percent per cycle). In the second, we reduce it far less in absolute terms (form L=.9 to L=.7), but do so one jump. Which produces the more volatile social dynamics, and why?
Runs 3 and 4. Salami Tactics of Corruption. 
Figure 8. Large Legitimacy Reduction In Small Increments
The same variables are plotted in Figure 9 . However, the scenario is different. We hold legitimacy at its initially high level (of 0.90) for 77 periods.
Then, in one jump, we reduce it to 0.70, where it stays. The upper legitimacy curve is a step function. Even though the absolute legitimacy reduction (of 0.30) is far smaller than before, there is an explosion of actives, shown by the red spike. And, in turn, there is a sharp rise in the jailed population, whose absolute size exceeds that of the previous run.
Figure 9. Small Legitimacy Reduction In One Jump t=77
The spatial situations in the two runs are compared in Figure 10 .
Each snapshot is for t=77, the time of the one-shot legitimacy reduction above. Now, why the difference? In the incremental legitimacy reduction scenario, the potentially catalytic agents at the tail of the grievance distribution are being picked off in isolation, before they can stimulate a local contagion. The sparks, as it were, are doused before the fire can take off. In the second-one-shot reduction--case, even though the absolute legitimacy decline is far smaller, multiple highly aggrieved agents go active at once.
And by the same mechanism as discussed earlier, this depresses local C/A ratios enough that less aggrieved agents jump in. Hence, the rebellious episode is greater, even though the absolute legitimacy reduction is smaller.
It is the rate of change--the derivative--of legitimacy that emerges as salient.
This result would appear to have important implications for the tactics of revolutionary leadership. Rather than chip away at the regime's legitimacy over a long period with daily exposes of petty corruption, it is far more effective to be silent for long periods, and accumulate one punchy expose. Indeed, the single punch need not be as "weighty," if you will, as the "sum" of the daily particulars. (The one-shot legitimacy reduction need not be as great as the sum of all the incremental deltas.) Perhaps this is why
Mao would regularly seclude himself in the mountains in preparation for a dramatic reappearance, and why the return of exiled revolutionary leaders--like Lenin and Khomeini--are attended with such trepidation by authorities.
Perhaps this is also why dramatic "triggering events" (e.g., assassinations)
loom so large in the literature on this topic; often, they are instances in which the legitimacy of the regime suddenly takes a dive. While often sufficient, sharp legitimacy reductions are not the only inflammatory mechanism.
Run 5. Cop Reductions
Indeed, "It is not always when things are going from bad to worse that revolutions break out," wrote de Tocqueville. "On the contrary, it oftener happens that when a people that has put up with an oppressive rule over a long period without protest suddenly finds the government relaxing its pressure, it takes up arms against it." According to Kuran (1989) , in the cases of the French, Russian, and Iranian revolutions, "substantial numbers of people were privately opposed to the regime. At the same time, the regime appeared strong, which ensured that public opposition was, in fact, unalarming. What, then, happened to break the appearance of the invincibility of the regime and to start a revolutionary bandwagon rolling? In the cases of France and Iran, the answer seems to lie, in large measure, in a lessening of government oppression." Indeed, De Tocqueville wrote that "liberalization is the most difficult of political arts." Here we interpret liberalization as cop reductions. Beginning at a high level, we walk the level of cops down. Figure 11 shows the typical result. the cop level--would produce dynamics equivalent to those under legitimacy reduction. As we see, however, the dynamics are fundamentally different.
Stylized Facts Generated in Model I
While Model I is embryonic and preliminary, it does produce noteworthy phenomena with some qualitative fidelity and therefore seems, at the very least, promising. We saw, first, the unexpected emergence of showing that (quite unlike legitimacy reductions) incremental reductions in repressive potential (cops) can produce large-scale tipping events. Finally, it may offer a useful laboratory to explore peacekeeping operations.
It should be added that the individual-level specification is quite minimal, imposing bounded demands on the agent's (and cops) information and computing capacity, while still insisting that the agent crudely weigh expected benefits against expected costs in deciding how to act. Agents are boundedly rational and locally interacting; yet interesting macroscopic phenomena emerge.
As noted at the outset, the model seems most promising for cases of decentralized upheaval. While one could argue that certain effects of revolutionary leadership--reductions in perceived legitimacy through rousing speeches or writings that expose regime corruption--are captured, explicit leadership as such is really not modeled. That could be a weakness in cases--for example, the communist Chinese revolution--where central leadership was important, though some would argue that, even there, the main issue was not the individual leader, but society's "ripeness for revolution." As Engel's wrote, "In default of Napoleon, another would have been found."
(Cited in Kuran, 1989) . Our tension index might be a crude measure of this "ripeness."
Let us turn now to situations of interethnic violence, as in Kosovo or
Rwanda. We will elaborate the model to represent conflict between two ethnic groups.
CIVIL VIOLENCE MODEL II: INTER-GROUP VIOLENCE
Although distinct cultural groups have been generated in agent-based computational models (Epstein and Axtell, 1996; Axelrod, 1997) , here, we will posit two ethnic groups: Blue and Green. Agents are as in Model I and turn Red when active. But now, "going active" means killing an agent of the other ethnic group. The killing is not confined to agents of the out-group known to have killed. It is indiscriminant. In this variant of the model, "legitimacy" is interpreted to mean each group's assessment of the other's right to exist, and for the moment, L is exogenous and the same for each group. (In Appendix B, we indicate how the model can be extended to endogenize legitimacy, allowing it to vary over time, and to take different values for each group.)
For Model II, we also introduce some simple population dynamics.
Specifically, agents clone offspring onto unoccupied neighboring sites with probability p each period. Offspring inherit the parent's ethnic identity and grievance. Because there is birth, there must be death to prevent saturation.
Accordingly, agents are assigned a random death age from U(0, max_age).
Here, max_age=100. Cops are as before, and arrest--evenhandedly--Red agents within their vision. There is no in-group policing in this version of the model, though Fearon and Laitin (1996) argue convincingly that this may be important in many cases.
Run 6. Peaceful Coexistence
For the first run of Model II, we set Legitimacy to a high number, just to check whether peaceful coexistence prevails with no cops. Figure 12 depicts a typical situation.
Figure 12. Peaceful Coexistence
On the left, we clearly see spatial heterogeneity and peaceful mixing of groups with no red agents. On the right, we see only the palest of pink shades, indicating low levels of grievance. Harmonious diversity prevails.
However, with no cops to regulate the competition, if L falls, even to 0.8, the picture darkens substantially. Indeed, we grow ethnic cleansing.
Run 7. Ethnic Cleansing
The sequence of four panels clearly shows local episodes of ethnic cleansing, leading ultimately to the annihilation of one group by the other:
genocide.
Animation 7. Local Ethnic Cleansing To Genocide
Over a large number of runs (n=30), genocide is always observed. The victor is random. The phenomenon is strongly reminiscent of "competitive exclusion" in population biology (see May, 1976) . When two closely related species compete in a confined space for the same resource, one will gain an edge and wipe the other out. If, however, the inter-species competition is regulated by a predator that feeds evenhandedly on the competitors, then both can survive. Peacekeepers are analogous to such predators. We introduce them in Run 8.
Run 8. Safe Havens
We begin this run exactly as in the previous genocide case. But, at t=50, we deploy a force of peacekeepers. They go to random unoccupied sites on the lattice. And this typically produces safe havens. A representative result is shown in Figure 13 .
Figure 13. Safe Havens Emerge Under Peacekeeping
Rather than begin with no cops initially, as in the previous run, we now offer a case in which the initial cop density is high. Once a stable pattern has emerged, we withdraw the cops.
Animation 9. Initial Peacekeepers Withdrawn
We begin in Panel 1 with a high cop density of 0.04. With heavy authority from the start, we see the emergence of a stable but nasty regime.
The presence of cops prevents either side from wiping the other out, but their co-existence is not peaceful. On the right screen, it is clear that ethnic hostility is widespread at all times. Then, beginning in Panel 2, all cops are withdrawn--the peacekeepers suddenly go home. Ceteris paribus, there is reversion to competitive exclusion and, predictably, by Panel 5, one side has wiped the other out.
Clearly, peacekeeping forces can avert genocide. But what is the overall relationship between the size of a peacekeeping presence and the incidence of genocide? As an initial exploration of this complex matter, we conducted a sensitivity analysis on cop density.
Cop Density and Extinction Times
For purposes of this analysis, all cops are in place at time zero. But there will be random run-to-run variations in their initial positions and, of course, in their subsequent movements. These initial cop densities are systematically varied from 0.008 up to 0.01, in increments of 0.002. For each such value, the model was run 50 times until the monochrome--genocide--state was reached. (If it was not reached after 15,000 cycles, we cut off the computation). So, at each density, there is a sample distribution of waiting times over the 50 runs. First, we plot the means of these distributions at each initial density. In Figure 14 we show that curve, and also the best linear fit to the same data. with increasing force size! This is counterintuitive and reflects the extreme path dependency and high variance of the process. Indeed, as Figure 15 shows, the variance in waiting time itself increases with density, and is very great above a density of around 0.05. The devil would appear to be in the details in peacekeeping operations.
Above a certain point, higher force levels per se, do not confer much higher confidence of the outcome in these spatially distributed path dependent dynamics. In figure 16 , the standard deviation in waiting times is plotted against force density. 
The case explored in the text is α = 0. Clearly, as we increase α , we increase the deterrent effect of jail, an effect worth exploring. The next three extensions concern the ethnic violence Model II.
[2] Endogenous Legitimacy Define the Green-induced Blue per period attrition rate as Now, this extension will tend to produce spirals of violence once a few risk neutral aggrieved agents begin executing members of the other group. Each group's evaluation of the other's legitimacy will be revised downward, leading to escalating violence unless there are breaks on the process. Of course, peacekeepers are one such regulatory mechanism. But, a richer model would allow for the endogenous regulation of inter-ethnic violence, despite high tension, without external forces. A modification that would operate to mitigate the escalatory dynamic just noted is as follows.
[3] Agents estimate the probability of other-group retaliation.
Recall that agents compute the probability of arrest via the formula: Then, even in the absence of cops (C=0), an explosion of Green actives would serve to deter Blue activation, and vice versa, damping the escalatory pressures generated under endogenous legitimacy above. How the two effects --escalatory and deterrent--would interact is potentially quite rich.
[4] Relative Deprivation.
A final and easily implemented extension would crudely capture relative deprivation (Gurr, 1972) . One would assume different Hardship distributions for different ethnic groups. For example, one could draw the Hardship of Blue agents from U(0, .4), and the Hardship of Green agents from U(.5, .9)., in which case the poorest Green would still be better off than the richest Blue.
Computational Reconstruction
The principal longer-term objective would be the computational reconstruction of the true sequence of events in, for example, Rwanda. This effort would be on the model of the Artificial Anasazi Project, which-aided by an extremely detailed environmental and demographic data base-did reconstruct important elements of a true spatio-temporal history in an agentbased computational model. For a report, see Dean, et al (1999) .
